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PART E:
NAVAL OPERATIONS

Volume 4/2012
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PART E: NAVAL OPERATIONS

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALWs) ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING: ANOTHER CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY
D. Dalaklis, G. Chrysochou
Welcome Address by the Commandant of the Hellenic Naval Academy

We welcome the 4th edition of the “Nausivios Chora” which illustrates the work of the Hellenic Naval Academy concerning the Naval Sciences.

Nowadays, at a time of economic and social problems, the edition of the “Nausivios Chora” underlines the effort of the staff of the Hellenic Navy Academy and other Institutes to create with their work positive expectations and knowledge enrichment both to the students of the Higher Military Educational Institutions and to other Universities that are engaged with Naval Sciences. They are targeting to inform and display new methods and sophisticated techniques based on personal research and analysis, in order to educate and train the new scientists.

Therefore, I wellcome the fourth edition of the “Nausivios Chora” with the wish for it to be a motive for the development and progress of the Naval Science not only in Greece but also abroad.

Rear-Admiral I. Maistros HN, Commandant of the Hellenic Naval Academy
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"Nausivios Chora" is a scientific journal published since 2006 by the Hellenic Naval Academy, the Institution that provides academic and professional training to the future officers of the Hellenic Navy. The faculty members of the Hellenic Naval Academy are devoted to the promotion of research and education on a broad range of scientific disciplines.

"Nausivios Chora" is a biannual, peer-reviewed, open access journal that publishes original articles in areas of scientific research and applications directly or indirectly related to the naval sciences and technology. The scope of the Journal is to provide a basis for the communication and dissemination of scientific results obtained in Hellenic or International academic and research institutions that may present a relevance to the sea element.

"Nausivios Chora" hosts articles belonging to various scientific disciplines and is divided in five parts, namely Mechanical and Marine Engineering, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Humanities and Political Sciences and Naval Operations. The present 2012 Edition Issue contains 24 articles.

The International Advisory Committee members and the Body of Reviewers, all acknowledged experts in their field of interests, cover a wide range of scientific disciplines ensuring the integrity of the peer-review process and the academic excellence of the published articles in a way that best represents the aims and scope of the Journal.

Prof Dr Elias Ar Yfantis
Editor in chief
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E.Ar.Yfantis
PART E:

NAVAL OPERATIONS
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) Illegal Trafficking: Another Challenge for Global Security

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Abstract: The end of the Cold War brought about new security challenges for the conventional arms control field. Many conflicts, interstate and intrastate ones, started to emerge (or better re-emerge) around the globe. Especially in countries of the developing world, numerous armed clashes occurred based on ethnic and religious divisions. These conflicts benefited from a deregulated arms market, which made the nature of the conventional arms trade more vigorous than ever before, thus created new security challenges for the agenda of conventional arms control field. Taking into account that human life and dignity are being threatened worldwide by the circulation and accumulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), new tasks for the Military and particularly the Naval Operations Doctrines started to take effect and be implemented through the Naval Blockade and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) during the recent interstate and intrastate conflicts. Therefore, the old-fashioned arms control agenda must be expanded under a comprehensive and holistic approach to include issues like the effective control of arms transfers at a global level and combating illicit arms trafficking and arms brokering, especially in the category of SALWs.

Keywords: Maritime Transport, Small Arms Stockpiles, Arms Trade, Light Weapons Proliferation, Disarmament, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

PACS: 89.40.Cc

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the cold-war era, the international system has changed significantly and patterns within the international arms trade domain moved towards a different direction. [1] Quite often, it has been argued that: “the bulk of the trades in major weapons become banal, posing no clear threat to security”. [2] The specific market is now characterized as smaller and looser when compared with the recent past, but clearly there is still a very large volume of transactions involved; it also remains extremely complicated and with rather limited potential for effective control. Of course, numerous initiatives for the regulation of the various aspects of arms trade -both globally and regionally, or even at the national level- are already in place. Well known examples are the United Nations (UN) Register for Conventional Arms, the European Union (EU) Code of Conduct on Arms Trade and many others. [3] However, a large number of on-going (low-intensity, or intra-state conflicts) round the globe turned the international
community's attention towards the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) issue, revealing the disproportionate impact of SALWs. While accounting for only one-fifth of the global arms trade, they are responsible for heavy injuries and killings of far more people world-wide than any other conventional weapon. Small arms were the most commonly used weapons in the more than a hundred conflicts fought worldwide between 1989 and 1996. A study commissioned by the United Nations World Health Organization and the World Bank found that by 2020, the number of deaths and injuries resulting from war and violence would overtake the number of deaths caused by diseases.[4] Conceived as a serious threat for global security, the aforementioned issue started to be considered and endorsed under the agenda of the traditional conventional arms control context, constituted before merely of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention.[5] It is widely accepted that the conclusion of the super-powers' confrontation resulted in the supply of SALWs to exceed demand, thus becoming cheap and relatively easy to obtain. In its turn, this might lead to the arming of the local criminal groups and eventually the circulation of weaponry abroad, perpetuating the opportunities for rioting and violent armed insurrection elsewhere. [6] Needless to mention, there is an obvious connection between the recent increase of piracy activity in Africa (Somalia and Gulf of Guinea) because of the easy access to various types of weapons for the local population. [7] And, of course, during the last years a large number of naval operations (i.e. coalition forces during the 1st Gulf War, or NATO in the recent Balkan Wars and the Libyan Civil Conflict) had as major task of their mission the disruption of the weapons supply routes to the warring factions and/or opponents. There is a simple reason behind this action: oceans and seas of the planet are by far the most frequently used medium of transport (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. Core and Secondary maritime routes [8]
Illegal weapons trafficking, although an old product of the cold-war period, has been considered with much greater seriousness only during the last few years. The primary sources of this plague, have been the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) being at that time under economic dislocation; the Afghan Pipeline, a distribution system established by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1980s for the supply of the Mujahedeen; some African countries under past interstate and intrastate conflicts, like Angola and Mozambique; and some South-eastern Asian countries through the oddments of their past wars, namely Cambodia and Vietnam. A relatively recent United Nations' Conference on SALWs revealed that eight million guns are made every year and 25 per cent of the four billion US$ small arms trade is illicit. [9] Inconsistent policies of export controls and embargoes have played a major role, assisting many of the significant transfers of weapons and related technology that have taken place covertly, including those which are illegal, when international embargoes and national licensing procedures are circumvented.

Moreover, even when these "grey market" transactions have been difficult to be kept out of the public eye due to regional and international transparency regimes, the "black market" of the uncontrolled and unobserved movement of vast quantities of small weapons and ammunition has posed the most serious impediments for an effective control and has inflicted the worst consequences. The problem has received extremely large dimensions, so that one estimate suggests that the size of the illegal arms market could range from US$1 billion to US$10 billion, about half of the "legal" arms trade when the demand is high. [10] Small arms are widely accepted as the most widely used tools of violence; the comment of a human rights campaigner of Amnesty International is characteristic: “As a human rights campaigner, I’ve visited countless countries where people suffer terrible abuses...Behind so many of these atrocities is one common factor: the gun...and behind that gun are the arms dealers, profiting from a trade that’s barely regulated and spiraling out of control”. [11]

The reverberation of the above issue has started to compel the global community to minimize all small arms transfers. In that context, under a conference held in New York in 2001, the international community started to work on this task, establishing a UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects (PoA). Additionally, there was a signing of an international Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, as a supplementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. [12] These initiatives continued in a similar UN conference under the auspices of the Group of Governmental Experts for the purpose of tracing illicit arms trade and of addressing the issue of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). [13] However, the arms trade and especially the illicit and covert arms trade in SALWs poses itself as one of the most controversial international issues of our actuality. Moreover, the inter-linkages with the conventional arms control agenda and the peace-management processes complicate further its character, revealing different problematic areas and approaches in several regions of the globe and a long-term confrontation between unilateralism and multilateralism in every initiative or discussion concerning its effective management and control.

**ILLICIT AND COVERT ARMS TRADE: THE "GREY" AND "BLACK" MARKET**

The illicit and covert arms trade, divided into the **grey market** and the **black market**, involves a range of state and non-state actors. As it was stated in Jane’s Intelligence Review, “although often considered to work independently of one another, one of the most important traits of the illicit arms trade is the extent to which the licit and illicit world are complicit in their actions”. [14] The grey market is associated with the diversion of legal stockpiles and refers to
Nausivios Chora

state supplies of arms to non-state actors or to embargoed states. It has started during the Cold War, allowing the superpowers to arm insurgent groups involved in conflicts throughout satellite states and continued in the Post-Cold War era, where NATO members supplied the Kosovo Liberation Army during the Balkan conflict and private military companies—with the knowledge of western states—have supplied weapons to Sierra Leone and Liberia, in spite of the UN's sanctions.

On the other hand, apart from direct government supplies, legal stockpiles are eventually diverted to the black market in other ways, like violations of arms embargoes by private arms brokers, theft from military arsenals, and theft of stockpiles in collapsed states. In that context, the involvement of organized crime in the illicit arms trade is almost entirely limited to the black market. [15] The criminal groups involved in the black market have their own dynamics in structure and function. Retailers and middlemen operate based on the principle of demand and supply, looking for new routes for transporting weapons should a new demand occur in any given part of the world. These dynamics made some experts in several conferences related to the subject in question to argue that what started as an enterprise spawned by a political revolution, soon became an enterprise operated for financial gain, which under the threat of crossing international borders, makes the internal security of all nations vulnerable. [16] This was obvious in the case of the uprisings in Albania in 1991 and 1997, where one million small arms were stolen from the Albanian arsenals and first used in Kosovo, while soon a network of gangs emerged, developing routes for arms sales that extended to the rest of Europe, the Middle East, the US and Turkey.

In general, the operation dynamics of the illicit arms trade are concentrated on transportation, mainly in the maritime domain where opportunity is always present. Shipments of illicit arms often virtually disappear while moving from source to final destination; on the documentation, where appropriate documentation is obtained in several ways, including through the corruption of authorized officials, or through the use of forged or counterfeit papers, or even through documentation fraud; on corruption, where, used by all actors involved in arms smuggling, it is sometimes needed to access state-controlled stockpiles or to circumvent export licensing and customs regulations; and finally, on the financing and banking, where payments can take the form of commercial payments to avoid bank involvement, or shipments can be paid in the form of letters of credit and direct transfers of hard-currency funds under the process of money laundering in order to disguise the final destination. [17]

Taking into account the overarching lack of transparency within the legal arms trade, be it state-controlled or by private manufacturers, the generally accepted fact by the majority of international authorities that the demand for weapons is high and unlikely to diminish in the immediate future, and the downward trend in prices (for example, the AK-47 Kalashnikov automatic rifle used to cost about 125 dollars straight from the factory in the FSU and now it can be purchased for 30 dollars at Russian flea markets) [18], the whole situation has started to be very worrying. Armed conflicts, or authoritarian and unrecognized "de facto" states, which appear after these conflicts serve as a source of terrorist activities and illegal arms trade, destabilizing even further the particular regions, as well as the border security of the neighboring states. It is not possible to install viable export regulatory regimes in territories, like Nagornyy Karabakh or the Kurdish populated territory of Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq. [19] Another case study, the one of Slovakia, reveals more complicated dimensions of the problem, particularly in the Slovak-Ukrainian border, where poorly-paid and poorly-trained conscripts who guard the weapon stores and the borders are susceptible to bribes and intimidation, easing the possible transit of illegal weapons. [20] On the other hand, the situation of the illicit arms trade, especially that concerning the SALWs, in other selected regions of the world, like Southern Africa, Northwestern South Asia and Central America, seems to be much more complicated and unscrupulous, involving many of the superpowers and modern European states that claim to
fight this scourge. The routes of this kind of proliferation are presented on Figures 2 and 3 respectively.

**FIGURE 2.** Light weapons proliferation and circulation in selected regions (1) [21].
SALWs: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS

Security challenges of the SALWs arise from their distinctive features, being their low cost, their portability, their minimum training requirements and their concealability. Light arms cost a tiny fraction of the price of major conventional weapon systems. They can be carried by an individual soldier or by light vehicles and they require very little of a repair and maintenance infrastructure. In addition, an individual combatant is able to receive the necessary training to fire a gun or a light weapon in only a few hours or days, and finally, SALWs can be concealed in the clothing or hand luggage of a single individual, making them the perfect tools...
for assassinations, terrorism and banditry. [23] An example of their concealability is the case study of Slovenia, where the relevant authorities have identified various methods of hiding weapons and their components, as inside televisions, radios, books, dog food, or even inside a loaf of bread, a chocolate bar or a coffee pack. [24]

On the other hand, the above distinctive characteristics are in accordance with the dynamics of this sort of weapons, being their increased lethality, especially after the end of the cold war, and the proliferation of their making technology. For instance, modern assault guns can fire a burst of 30-35 bullets, inflicting the death of many people at once, particularly in crowded environments, as the February 1994 Hebron massacre committed with a 35-round Galil assault gun. Moreover, while the production of major conventional weapon systems is confined to a dozen of industrial powers, the production of SALWs is spread to a much larger group of countries. It is a fact that by 1999, approximately 45 nations were producing light weapons of one sort or another, 22 of them being in the developing world. [25] According to the survey of 2005 made by the World Policy Institute of New York, small arms are responsible for two million casualties each year. Almost 300,000 – mostly civilians – are killed in wars and other armed conflicts and insurgencies; another 200,000 people are killed in homicides, suicides and unintentional shootings, while small arms fires wound one and a half million people around the world annually. [26] Totally aware of this terrible reality, The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated in the UN's SALWs Conference of New York in June-July 2006 that the proliferation of light weapons, such as machine guns, has spawned a “culture of violence”. [27] This is evident from the data in Table 1.

### TABLE 1. Small Arms Stockpiles and ratio of population per arms [28]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Armed Forces Weapons</th>
<th>Police Weapons</th>
<th>Civilian Weapons</th>
<th>Total Weapons*</th>
<th>Num. of Citizens per Weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>74,035,000</td>
<td>1,935,000</td>
<td>257,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>74,033,000</td>
<td>2,192,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5,703,000</td>
<td>313,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>933,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>68,234,000</td>
<td>3,947,000</td>
<td>199,000</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>2,687,000</td>
<td>147,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>20,975,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>674,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5,374,000</td>
<td>1,363,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>503,000</td>
<td>29,231,000</td>
<td>939,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>293,027,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>240,000,000</td>
<td>24,573,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9,563,000</td>
<td>201,000</td>
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<td>U.A.E</td>
<td>4,496,000</td>
<td>207,000</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>7,500,000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5,374,000</td>
<td>1,888,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>293,027,000</td>
<td>256,000,000</td>
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*Minimum small arms total stockpiles, including armed forces, police and privately-owned weapons.
Trying to identify how this vast accumulation of light weapons occurs, the Bonn International Centre Conversion Survey argues that three models of the global spread of SALWs have been put forward. The first one is the proliferation model, which, following the familiar pattern of the conventional arms trade, supports that there are a handful of major producers exporting weapons to a large number of recipients, so policies must focus on detaining the flow on the supply and recipient side. The second one is the circulation model, which, maintaining that the number of small arms already transferred to volatile areas cannot be controlled with supply-oriented approaches due to the illicit trade basically with government involvement, supports that disarmament policies must be devised and focus not only on lowering the domestic availability, but also on lowering the relevant demand for them. Finally, the last model, known as the diffusion model combines the aforementioned ones, by giving a typology of the ways by which these weapons are acquired by parties to a conflict. These include [29]:

- Indigenous production.
  - Purely domestic.
  - Imported technology and licensed production.
- Legitimate import.
  - Government grants.
  - Government sales.
  - Commercial sales.
- Illicit import.
  - Covert arms transfer from foreign governments.
  - Foreign government gifts to paramilitary groups.
  - Black market arms imports.
  - Imports from allied foreign insurgent groups.
- In-country circulation.
  - Theft from government arsenals.
  - Seizure of equipment from opponents.
  - Exchanges between domestic insurgent organizations.
  - Exchanges between domestic insurgent and criminal organizations.

While the first model is usually related to a multilateral approach in conventional arms trade control, preferred by supporters of the traditional arms trade regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the UN's Protocol on Firearms and few more, it lacks of the ability to embrace the regional and domestic problematic folds and it is driven in majority by politically binding directives. The second model is often based on a unilateralist approach in the field in question, so lacking of the universality of norms and principles. The third model, in a policy perspective of course, can drive through thorough and in-depth integrated approaches in the issue of SALWs control, but it requires the willingness of all the actors under a common reference point and a legally binding regime, such as a possible international arms trade treaty, including the issue of SALWs and their ammunition.

**International level**

The three major international regimes in the field of conventional arms trade control are the UN's Register of Conventional Arms, merely limited on the field of transparency and information exchange; the UN's Firearms Protocol as a supplementation of the UN's Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which excludes of its agenda the state-to-state or state-to-non-state actors transactions of the particular weapons; and the UN's Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALWs in All Its Aspects, which does not include the "legal" trade of these weapons and does not provide any enforcement mechanisms,
being only politically binding. The UN Register of Conventional Arms, established on 9 December 1991 by the UN General Assembly, called upon all the UN states to provide annually information on the previous years’ imports and exports of seven types of weapons: tanks; ACVs, large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, missiles and missiles launchers. [32] Recently, two amendments have been included concerning the lowering of artillery threshold reporting down to 75mm and the inclusion of MANPADS. [33] Although the Register calls upon member-states to exercise restraint in exports and imports of conventional arms by placing adequate laws and administrative procedures, it is not a legally binding convention and contains many qualitative and quantitative shortcomings. For example most of Russia’s declared arms exports, including those to China and Taiwan, could not be verified, because many of the recipients do not participate in the Register, like China, most Arab states and African countries. [34] The main reason for that participation unwillingness is the non-inclusion of SALW in the Register and its discriminatory character, since it includes only transfers and not weapon inventories. This, results in a fairly accurate notion about the arms inventories of the importing countries not possessing a significant indigenous defense industry, whereas the major arms producers, not importing much have got considerably less to report, keeping the actual state of their inventories undisclosed. [35] Consequently, the Register does not provide so much transparent assessment for the military potential of many countries, having additionally a lot of discrepancies on the type and model of weapons, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. [36] The only legally binding document concerning global measures to regulate international transfers of weapons, but limited itself in the category of small arms, has been the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which has been established in June 2001 by a relevant General Assembly resolution as a supplementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. [37] The parties to the Protocol have undertaken the legal commitments to combat the illicit trade in firearms by criminalizing the trafficking-related activities in their domestic laws; seizing and destroying confiscated weapons; keeping records and providing for an exchange information, experience and technical assistance; marking weapons at the manufacturing point and at import; complementing the import and transit licensing requirements under a common content; and finally establishing security measures for the prevention of theft, loss or diversion of weapons. [38] However, despite its global, legally binding applicability, the Protocol comprises imperfections and weaknesses. To begin with, it applies merely to the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms and their components and to the investigation and prosecution of offences established under Article 5 of the Protocol, where those offences are transnational in nature, involving organized criminal groups as well. [39] This means that it does not apply to state-to-state transactions or to state-to-non-state actors transactions and moreover it does not enable itself to the regulation of the legal trade in arms, which under the globalized and innovating market networks of rogue states and relevant non-state actors, may sounds legal formally but it is illegal by nature. Additionally, it merely encourages state-parties that have established a system of licensing or authorization of manufacturing or a system of licensing and authorization of brokering, to include the relevant information in their exchanges of information. In addition, it only suggests for national registration and licensing systems of arms brokers, without any obligatory mandate on that field. [40]

Eventually, a modest (but significant) step towards the development of international norms and practices for restrictions on SALWs has been the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, known as UN PoA, which contains measures to be undertaken at the national, regional and global levels. [41] At the national level, the UN PoA agreed, inter alia, to put in place adequate laws and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production, exports, imports and retransfers of SALWs, criminalizing the relevant illicit activities; to establish national coordination agencies for policy guidance and monitoring as well as national point of contacts as
a liaison between states; to ensure the reliable and licensed marking procedures as well as the accurate record-keeping; to assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations; to use authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement measures; to make notifications to the original exporting states about re-exports; to develop laws and procedures regulating the activities of those engaged in SALWs brokering; to take all the appropriate legal and administrative issues against any activity violating the UN arms embargoes; to ensure that confiscated small arms are destroyed or disposed under officially authorized processes; to destroy surplus SALWs; and to develop effective DDR programs where possible. At the regional level the UN PoA agreed, *inter alia*, to strengthen the moratoria in the affected regions; to establish sub-regional and regional mechanisms for combating the illicit trade in SALWs across borders; to encourage the promotion of safe stockpile management under the regional mechanisms; to encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant legally binding instruments; to establish a point of contact within sub-regional and regional organizations acting as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of PoA; and to encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, measures to enhance transparency.

At the global level the UN PoA agreed, *inter alia*, to request the UN Secretary General to collate data provided by states on a voluntary basis on the implementation of the program; to encourage co-operation with the World Customs Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in order to identify groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade of SALWs; to encourage states to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime; and finally to co-operate with the UN system for the effective implementation of the UN arms embargoes. [42] Although through a general assessment of the UN PoA it is noticeable that it has provided general guidance for governments, regional and international organizations as well as the civil society in combating the illicit trade on SALWs, yet it is not legally binding, it does not offer compulsory transparency mechanisms and in addition, owing to the opposition of the USA, it has never reached consensus on the need to establish effective controls over the private ownership of SALWs or on the need to halt sales of such weapons to non-state actors. [43] However, this program of action has been the incentive for other similar regional and sub-regional initiatives.

**Regional and sub-regional level**

In a regional or sub-regional level there’s been a number of initiatives and strategies on the field of arms trade control, like the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of SALWs in West Africa, projecting West Africa as the first region globally to announce a halt to the procurement of SALWs, yet not legally binding, and promoting the moratorium as a possible Convention in the future. [44] Some other examples can be pin-pointed in America, like the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) [45] or in South-Eastern Europe, like the Stability Pact for SEE Regional Implementation Plan (SCSP RIP) and the South-Eastern European Clearinghouse SALW Control (SEESAC), [46] the latter working under the OSCE principles and the efforts of the participating states to accede in the EU. In contrast, in Asia, the efforts of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are of a very limited scope and effectiveness. [47]

At the inter-European level the major initiatives for conventional arms trade regulations, including the categories of SALWs and MANPADS can be observed on the Wassenaar Arrangement, the relevant principles and documents of OSCE and the relevant codes of conduct and joint actions of the EU. Wassenaar Arrangement, formally established in 1996 has been the first multilateral export control regime covering both armaments and sensitive dual-use
goods and technology. Actually, it is a voluntary export control regime whose 39 members exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies. Its purpose is to promote "greater responsibility" among its members in arms exports and to prevent 'destabilizing accumulations'. It targets at 'states of concern' to member-states. [48] During the recent years it has been expanded in scope to include best practices and guidelines for the control of SALWs [49] and MANPADS [50] as well as to provide elements for effective legislation on arms brokering among its state-parties. [51] However, member-states continue to be divided over Wassenaar’s scope, primarily whether the arrangement should become more than just a body for exchanging and collecting information. In addition there is no consensus among members over the definitions 'states of concern' and 'destabilizing transfers' and because the arrangement operates by consensus, a single country can block any proposal. This lack of legally binding provisions renders it difficult to achieve uniformity in arms exports policies and more importantly, some major arms exporters, such as Belarus, China, Israel and South Africa, are not members of the arrangement. [52]

One of the first ethical approaches concerning the regulation of the arms trade started under the agenda of OSCE principles in 1993 when its members, by reaffirming the principles governing the conventional arms transfers, they further broadened the aim of a cooperative and common approach to security. This has been achieved by considering among the others for their export policies, the respect for human rights in the recipient country; its record of compliance with its international commitments; the legitimate security needs of the recipient country; and its proportionate response to the security treats confronting it. [53] Under the Document of 2003 on SALWs, driven by the UN PoA, member-states agreed to ensure effective national control over manufacturing and licensing authorizations as well as to prosecute under appropriate penal codes those engaged in illegal production of SALWs. Each participating state should ensure its efficacy in enforcing its international commitments on SALWs through its national authorities and judicial system. The document provided for information exchange on SALWs exports and imports as well as of surplus, seized or destroyed small arms on an annual basis. [54] The additional decisions of OSCE on end-user certificates, [55] on stockpiles of conventional ammunition, [54] on control of SALWs brokering [56] as well as control of MANPADS [57] exports, broadened its scope of application. However, the OSCE principles on arms exports and the relevant supplementary documents on SALWs and MANPADs produce the same shortcomings as the UN PoA, yet in a lesser degree since OSCE has got an integrated, cooperative and common approach to security.

However, the most comprehensive efforts on the control of arms transfers and SALWs have been undertaken by the EU: through the EU Code of Conduct On Arms Exports, [58] the EU Council Common Position of 2003 on the Control of Arms Brokering [59] and the EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALWs and their Ammunition, [60], the latter supplementing the relevant EU Council Joint Action of July 2002. [61] The EU Code of Conduct On Arms Exports is based on standard ethical criteria, including the respect for human rights in the recipient country; the preservation of regional peace and stability; the national security of state-parties as well as the security of friendly and allied countries; the behavior of the recipient with regard to terrorism and international law; and the compatibility of arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country. The operative provisions of the Code of Conduct obliges member-states to circulate through diplomatic channels details of licenses refused accompanied by the relevant explanation and in depth consultation among the members for any transaction, pursuing in that way a uniformity in the arms exports policies. [62] The only shortcoming of the code is that the final decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item remains at the national discretion of each state since the code is only politically binding. However, all the members under the Common Security and Foreign Policy follow more or less a similar comprehensive approach to their national policies incorporating the commitments. A
characteristic example is the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria of the UK’s policy. [63]

Moreover, the EU Strategy against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALWs and their ammunition has developed a comprehensive and coherent approach which harnesses all forms of leverage at the European’s Union disposal and in addition, it has developed a multifaceted action to cover all the dimensions of the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALWs, both preventive and reactive. Finally it supports effective multilateralism and all the relevant international and regional initiatives under diplomatic channels, field missions, partnership and cooperation, assistance programs and generally a promotion of the relevant successful European Union’s national and regional control systems for adaptation all around the world. The most significant objectives of the EU Strategy are the support of the adoption of a legally binding international instrument on the tracing and marking of SALWs and ammunition and the establishment of a consensus within exporting countries to only supplying SALWs to governments, in accordance with restrictive and appropriate regional and international criteria on arms exports. [64] Nevertheless, in the quest of these objectives, the best template would be an international, legally binding arms trade treaty and the step-up of the institutional capacity and scope of all the other regional organizations. Nevertheless, the whole policy of EU in the domain of arms transfers and SALWs regulation thrusts itself forward as the most comprehensive and integrated regime on the entire field of conventional arms control.

THE LINK OF DISARMAMENT AND SALWS ISSUES WITH THE PEACE-MANAGEMENT PROCESS

A major issue within the post-conflict agenda has been the exclusion of the prominent issue of SALWs from the formal post-conflict arms control arrangements, since the opposing parties and the peacekeeping forces treat it as a distinct security issue. For example, the Dayton process for the disarmament, following the war in ex-Yugoslavia, has not included weapon categories such as small arms and mines, being a “proxy” of the classical CFE Treaty process. [65] Having in mind the flow of such weapons to neighboring countries or other volatile regions in the aftermath of the conflicts through the organized crime nets, the negative consequences of this omission can be significant. One possible but not fully credible justification for the above omission is that the acknowledgment that often the process of disarmament is rendered more complicated by the inward role that weapons have come to play in some societies is missing from the existing literature on disarmament and conventional arms control. In many post-civil war societies, gun culture is well developed, reflecting a symbol of manhood rather than a weapon of violence and posing resistance in every effort to curb private ownership. This mannerism entails the necessity for disarmament strategies to bear in mind the “normal” role of guns in the society should they seek a greater chance of success. Based on this home truth, a certain number of academics supports that what is required are a mixture of limited disarmament and rigorous arms control with the preference to strengthen existing tribal structures and norms as restricting sources, rather than attempt to impose greenhorn and outlandish norms from without. [66] However, this complexity is not the only incompatibility of classical conventional arms control and disarmament when attempted to apply in several regions and societies of the world with different social, political, religious and security cultures. For example, Peter Jones, a Research Associate at the Munk Centre for International Relations in Toronto University, has argued for the relevant situation in Middle East: “Arms control is not achieved in a vacuum. Without an effort to establish a new regional political and security order it is highly unlikely that the most serious matters of arms control can be addressed. Of course, this is not to say that discussions over arms control issues should wait for the day when a regional system is fully established”. [67]
Such a system, as it was mentioned above, similar to the OSCE or the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SEE), could establish political and security bonds in the opposing parties and therefore, address issues like far-reaching arms control arrangements and arms transfers’ policies. If it is linked as well with the major international or other multifold regional initiatives, like the UN PoA in SALWs, the WA and EU Code on Arms Exports, it can provide solid foundations for the eve of a new, more secure and more promising for development era of the Middle East or the North Africa. [68] Inspired, mainly by the situation in Middle East and the remorseless global trade in arms, especially in unstable regions of the world, two contradictory approaches on conventional arms trade management and particularly on SALWs management have started to emerge. For convenience reasons one could define that as the controversy between unilateralism and multilateralism in the specific field. The controversy arguably defined as unilateralism against multilateralism on the domain of small arms trade regulatory efforts, is based actually on the two main policy attitudes concerning the field in question.

The first approach proceeds from the assumption that international efforts must focus on combating the illegal trade in all its aspects, including the illegal production, storage and transfer of SALWs. The related legal trade, under this approach, should be considered as a state’s sovereign right by the international community and be out of the field of major international and legally binding agreements. The advocates of this view, including US, China, India and Pakistan, are in favor of concentrating on formation of national practices and regulations under international exchange of information and collaboration and oppose against possible introductions of international transparency measures in SALWs production, stocks and transfers. [69] The statement of US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton during the Preparatory Committee process of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects – held in New York from 9-20 July 2001, is representative of such an approach: “The United States will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures contrary to our constitutional right to keep and bear arms”.[70] The second approach, often called “comprehensive approach”, is typical of the European Countries, inspired in many respects by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, and it presumes that legal and illegal trade should not be rigidly separated. Moreover the advocates of this approach support that the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms should be prevented through the elimination of their destabilizing accumulation and legal binding transparency measures of their legal transfers and stocks. The justification given is that illegally traded arms had been operated on legal basis and coverage under the operational networks of the black market. Many of the supporters of this approach stand not only for eliminating illegal trade under global, legally binding measures of transparency and national accountability, but also for establishing international control regimes over the production, stocks, storage and supply of arms. [71]

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

Conventional arms control is currently in a transitional phase, both in its conceptual framework and field of application. After the end of the Cold War it started to include in its agenda the issues of conventional arms trade and the SALWs transfers, although these domains have never been considered as components of the classical conventional arms control content. The post-cold war era has also revealed that reducing access to armaments will not significantly reduce the scale of ethnic conflicts in certain cases. The main reason is that too often these wars are not fought for political and strategic objectives -that are amenable to outside diplomacy- but for the perceived notion of survival being at stake between the warring factions. In that case, lack of proper weapons cannot often guarantee compromise, but only an invitation to improvise. The on-going civil conflict in Syria is a very strong example that illegal weapons will somehow find a way to enter a region in unrest. So, what is the objective of all the
recently established controls on conventional arms trade? Is it to end conflicts? The answer of course is no. However, avoiding thinking so narrowly, it is easy to understand that the more comprehensive and legally binding agreements and initiatives the international community is willing to establish, the less blood will be lost in conflicts. Moreover, it would be much more cost-effective to agree and implement internationally binding treaties than to spend assets and resources in Naval Operations and other similar military operations, such as MIO, to cope with the problem in the second phase. Additionally, the fact that these arms, especially SALWs, circulate in the aftermath of conflicts all around the globe, affecting significantly the peaceful societies under the networks of organized crime, highlights the importance of a holistic approach to the specific field.

REFERENCES

1. For example, the notion of the world divided into spheres of influence could no longer provide a sufficient explanation of the dynamics of arms supply and demand. See Cornish, Paul, Controlling the Arms Trade, London, Bowerdean Publishing Ltd., 1996, p. 31.
5. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, negotiated and signed during the final years of the cold war is often referred as ‘the cornerstone of European security’ since it eliminated the FSU’s overwhelming quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe by establishing equal limits on the amount of tanks, ACVs, heavy artillery, combat aircrafts and attack helicopters between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, covering an area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. More specifically, NATO and Warsaw Pact were each limited to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircrafts and 2,000 attack helicopters for the treaty’s area of application. For a further detailed view of the CFE Treaty provisions see US Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty”, 18 June 2002 and Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe”, [online], http://www.osce.org/library/14087, (Accessed 2 June 2012). The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001(CCW) is usually referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW Convention). It is also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The purpose of the Convention is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. For more details see International Committee of the Red Cross, “Conventional weapons and international humanitarian law”, and United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), “The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE60058594, (Accessed 02 June 2012).
10. See Cornish, P., Controlling the Arms Trade, op.cit. p. 251.
12. The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in New York from 9 -20 July 2001 as decided in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/54 V. Preceded by three preparatory committee sessions, the two-week Conference resulted in the adoption of the ‘Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ States are required to report to the United Nations on the progress of their implementation of the UN Programme of Action, commonly known as the PoA. The United Nations General Assembly scheduled a review conference in New York which was held from 26 June to 7 July 2006. The Review Conference was plagued by disagreements and states were unable to agree on a substantive outcome document. There have also been four Biennial Meetings of States to consider the implementation of the Program of Action, in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2010. The 2008 Biennial Meeting of States resulted in the adoption, by vote, of an Outcome Document focusing on three main issues: international assistance, cooperation and capacity-building, stockpile management and surplus disposal and illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons. The Fourth Biennial Meeting in 2010 was able to adopt, for the first time by consensus, a substantive Outcome Document which addresses the issue of illicit trade across borders. A review conference of the Program of Action is scheduled for the September 2012.
15. Ibid.
17. See Makarenko, T., “Tracing the dynamics of the illicit arms trade”, Jane’s Intelligence Review [online], op. cit.
22. Ibid., p. 145.
31. Ibid. pp. 54-55.
34. See Arms Control Association, “Russia Tops in Quantity of Arms Shipped in 2002”, op.cit.
40. Ibid, Article 15.
42. See UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Conventional Arms: Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, (UN Document A/CONF.192/15/).
45. Ibid, p. 146.
57. See OSCE, Decision No 8/04: OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, SEESAC, 2005.
70. However, some of the relevant experts do not embrace such a similar approach for the Middle East. For instance, Keith Krause, the program director of the Small Arms Survey launched in the Middle East periodical type, suggests that the biggest challenge for the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East is not to get the two sides to talk, but to get their small arms out of circulation. See Martin, J., “Small arms trigger alarms”, Middle East [online], October, 2005, (360), 26, op. cit.